Ståhl, T., & Cusimano, C. (2024). Lay standards for reasoning predict people’s acceptance of suspect claims. Current Opinion in Psychology, 55, 101727.

Ståhl, T., Yilmaz, S., Digby, N., & Stasko, P. (2024). Valuing epistemic rationality bolsters the effect of analytic thinking on skepticism toward pseudo-profound bullshit. Personality and Individual Differences, 217, 112452.

Ståhl, T., & Turner, J. (2021). Epistemic values and the Big Five: Personality characteristics of those who ascribe personal and moral value to epistemic rationality. PLoS ONE, 16(10): e0258228.

Ståhl, T., & Van Prooijen, J-W. (2021). Analytic atheism: Valuing epistemic rationality strengthens the association between analytic thinking and religious disbelief. Personality and Individual Differences, 179, 110914.

Ståhl, T. (2021). The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of unbelief, and their implications for morality. PLoS ONE, 16(2): e0246593.

Adam-Troian, J., Caroti, D., Arciszewski, T., & Ståhl, T. (2019). Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33, 720-727.

Ståhl, T, & Van Prooijen, J.-W. (2018). Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational. Personality and Individual Differences, 122, 155-163.

Ståhl, T., Zaal, M. P., & Skitka, L. J. (2016). Moralized rationality: Relying on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of belief can be seen as a moral issue. PLOS ONE 11(11): e0166332.

Ståhl, T., & Ellemers, N. (2016). Ironic effects of moral motivation: Why working toward a moral goal reduces subsequent perspective taking. Social Cognition, 34, 133-148.

Yilmaz, S., & Ståhl, T. Science beliefs: The role of analytic thinking and epistemic values. Manuscript in preparation.

Digby, N. & Ståhl, T. (2024). Derogating dissent: Ideological differences in responses to partisan ingroup dissent. Research in progress.

Yilmaz, S., & Ståhl, T. (2024). Belief Bias: The Role of Epistemic Values and Analytic Thinking. Research in progress.